Transaction: c079bef722a5cf9dc0834569f7414b005c942eb7

Included in block 19,135,979 at 2018/01/20 06:30:12 (UTC).

Transaction overview

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Transaction info
transaction_id c079bef722a5cf9dc0834569f7414b005c942eb7
ref_block_num 64,984
block_num19,135,979
ref_block_prefix 3,566,134,367
expiration2018/01/20T06:40:03
transaction_num 6
extensions[]
signatures 1f18ca80526162e84e1c39af871a860de68a31d04e494813e83ce51abc1828a1360c3923adc9dfbb66993bc1b2115835d96c6e32265b0b375106a8e06470088fdf
operations
comment
"parent_author":"snubbermike",<br>"parent_permlink":"re-smooth-steem-experiment-burn-post-5-20180119t114454491z",<br>"author":"smooth",<br>"permlink":"re-snubbermike-re-smooth-steem-experiment-burn-post-5-20180120t063004400z",<br>"title":"",<br>"body":"I have directly addressed this question in one of the earlier threads. It is possible that redirecting a portion of the reward pool in this manner will introduce more scarcity where then stakeholders exercise more care to see that remaining rewards are more focused on the most deserving posts. It is also possible that the total reward pool could be reduced so much that even the worst abusers share is reduced _in absolute amount_ (a sort of scorched earth strategy,<br> which could ultimately deter abuses). Or it is possible this has no beneficial effect whatsoever with respect to the reward pool.\n\nEither way I'm reasonably convinced this buy-and-burn strategy does act as a natural stabilizer for the SBD peg,<br> so that in itself is some benefit.",<br>"json_metadata":" \"tags\":[\"steem\" ,<br>\"app\":\"steemit\/0.1\" "
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