Transaction: ab6422bfdbb5d32829d9d13044a65386a96ff8d7

Included in block 89,046,533 at 2024/09/18 17:59:06 (UTC).
Loading...
Transaction info
transaction_id ab6422bfdbb5d32829d9d13044a65386a96ff8d7
ref_block_num 48,643
block_num89,046,533
ref_block_prefix 4,266,335,869
expiration2024/09/18T18:09:02
transaction_num 6
extensions[]
signatures 1f7904971b3252420139a67ca1d8c92febb56b1e52ab5c7f35c5a3a74a60221f8f11010fe06f41e189a5d3ed36645e101200425305cd90922b721911a4a9a91f4f
operations
comment
"author":"oaaguy",<br>"body":"it's a valid question,<br> and I think people might be able to present valid arguments either way. \nArgument for allowing treasurers on the board is that they are highly aligned to the foundation's purpose. However,<br> like you say,<br> there is risk of abuse of power and a potential to lack a diversity of opinion. \n\nOn the matter of centralization of power: \nthere remains to be seen how much power either role will have to act. Treasurers are stated to only act in accordance with whitepaper or DAO-authorized transactions.\nIf the board members are known and KYC'd,<br> there might be some future scenario where a board member is pressured (either legally,<br> or not) to pursue some action without authorization from the DAO. If none of the board members have wallet keys,<br> it seems that might reduce that particular sort of risk. ",<br>"json_metadata":" \"tags\":[\"spsdao\" ,<br>\"app\":\"peakd\/2024.8.7\" ",<br>"parent_author":"femisapiens",<br>"parent_permlink":"re-spsdao-sk0keo",<br>"permlink":"re-femisapiens-sk0smb",<br>"title":""